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I. Introduction 
Economists have been looking for a model with which they can 
叩 aly田卸erea血1greturns to scale (IRS）叩dimperf，田tcomp et註ion.
After a str泊gof unsuccessful attempts by a number of mdividuals, 
E. Helpman and P.R. Krugman，恒也eirbr剖iantbook Market S；前日加re
and Fore；.初 Trade,lmally developed a new model that str目白dboth of 
廿日記 concepts.And “today the border country between the theory of 
international trade and industrial structure is one of the most active 
areas in international economics" (p. !). 
Accordii1g to Helpman and Krugman, the traditional general equlibrium 
(GE) approach needs extensions in four m吋ora目前. It has failed to 
explaii1 (!) volume of trade, (2) composition of trade, (3) volume and 
role of intrafirm trade and direct foreign ii1vestment, and ( 4)welfare 
effects of trade liberalization. 
The volume of trade has traditionally been explaii1ed by differences 
in factor endowments, yet，“in practice, nearly half of the world’s trade 
consists of trade between industrial countries that are relatively snmlar m 
their reiatIVe factor endowments" (p. 2). Reflecting this fact the com・
position of trade should be explamed in terms of net exports, due to the 
substantial two-way trade in goods of s加盟町 factor泊tensity,Le., the 
“interindustry”trade. 
Intrafmn trade and direct foreign investment were also ba田don an 
inapptopnate framework泊 conventionaltrade theory, the convenient 
but unrealistic a田umptionsof perf，田tcompetition and con目antreturns 
to田ale,a situation that exists .nowhere in visible firms.“Again，卸
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reality much international trade consists of intrafirm transact10ns rather 
than arm’s length deahngs between unrelated par!ies-multinational fmns” 
(p. 3). 
With・ regard to the welfare effects of'trade liberalization, studies in the 
past have been based upon the concept of resource reallocation How-
ever,. eVJdence such as吐iatfrom the EEC皿d吐ieU.S.-C皿adaauto pact 
shows也at“litleresour回目allocationtook pla田；instead,trade seems 
to have permitted an increa田dproductivity of既 ISingresources, which 
left everyone better off”（p. 3). 
The above four po卸tscan become understandable once economies 
of scale are・ introduced加tothe analysis.“In reahty, many industnes do 
not田emto be characterized either by constant returns or perfect 
competition”(p. 3). The role of mcreasing returns is to give the idea that 
“economies of scale seem to allow a str匂htおrwardexplanation of our 
empirical puzzles”（p. 3). 
The puzzle of trade between similar countries can be solved if there 
are country-specific economies of scale. This provides a simple explana-
lion of intraindustry trade as“specialization which takes place to realize 
economies of scale rather than because of differences泊 factorrewards 
can easily involve two-way trade in goods with similar factor content" 
(p. 4). 
官ierelationship between increasing returns, intrafmn trade, and 
direct foreign investment is more indirect. Inpu臼，suchas headquarters' 
services and intermediate goods, give担cre田皿E日turnsspecific to par-
tic叫aruse四 hsuch c田es，“therew温bestrong. incentives to avoid吐ie
problems of bilateral monopoly by integrating upstream and down-
stream activi世esin a s泊glefirm”（p.4）.官邸invitesus to the world of 
也emulti-national corporation corpora世on(MNC) and the transnational 
corpora甘on(TNC）.“Trade 11beralization也atprodu田sall-round E岨 s
m也outsignific血 tresource reallocation is not al paradoxical in a world 
characterized by increasing returns, and where mtramdustry special-
ization and trade produ田 gains担 efficiency也rougilincreased scale of 
production”（p.4). 
Increasing re加rnsto scale are, of course, inconsistent with perfect 
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competition. The.fact that there exists no generally accepted theory of 
imperfect competition prevents the development of trade theory with 
increasing returns. 
Helpman and Krugman start with two classic questions: (I) What 
determines the pattern of international trade? and (2) Is international 
trade beneficial? Both questions are valuable as a way of structuring 
discussion around a general model They construct as a reference point 
the concept of “Integrated economy or equ迎brium”（IE),defined as a 
situation where the factors of production are perfectly mobtle. They 
then proceed to“carve up”the world mto田paratecountries asking 
the followmg questions：“Under what conditions will the integrated 
economy be reproduced through trade? What transactions are needed to 
of品目 thefact也atthe world is divided into countries？回dm凶 is
needed to reproduce the integrated economy as a way of revealmg the 
e田entialrole of an international economic lmkage？”（p. 5). 
I. Factor Proportions Theory and Market S加1cture
,The core of modern mternational trade theory 1s the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model (HOM) and its extensions一thefactor proportion theory. The 
m句orpurpo田 ofHelpman and Krugman is“to show that many of the 
insights ga加edfrom traditional theory continues to be useful even in a 
world where increasing returns and imperfect competition are 1mpor-
tant”（p. I I).
B凶ldinga model of IE, following血atof Dixit and Norman (1980, 
chapter 4), they ask“whe血erit is possible to achieve the same resource 
allocation Jf factors of production are instead divided up田nongcoun-
tnes and there is no internationaI factor mobility”（p. 11). Their conclu-
sion is “there is a田tof allocations of factors to countnes for which this 
is possible. If factor endowments.lie within this set，世田factorprices will 
be equalized也roughtrade" (p. 11). Let us cal白isset the白ctorprice 
equal包ation(FPE）田LIf factor prices are equalized and the ・countries 
have identical homothetJc preferences, we can deduce .a relationship 
between factor endowments and trade, similar to that of Vanek (1968). 
“If we look at the factor services embodied in a country’s trade』wewill 
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fmd a country is a net exporter of the services of which 1t has a relatively 
large share of the world’S回pply”（pp.11-12). 
Like most of the traditional theories, HOM and its extensions rest 
on the s加plifyinga田umptionof constant m血msto scale. Relaxing the 
出血mphonof constant-re加ms(C郎） technology, does, accord均 to
Ohlin (1933），“provide an incentive for interna世onalspecialization and 
trade that can四pplementthe incentives created by cro田ーcountrydiffer-
ences in factor endowments" (p. 31). 
However, as soon as the as皿mphonof CRS 1s relaxed, we must face 
the problems of market structures other than the familiar perfectly com-
petitive economy 
“Since there is no generally accepted theory of imperfect competition, 
it has seemed impossible to say any也inggeneral about trade佃 aworld 
who田 technologyallows for increasing returns”. The only possible way 
allowed for us is to“analyze mternahonal trade under田veralalternahve 
出血mptionsabout the nature of competition”（p. 31). 
In their book, Helpman and Krugman consider the following: 
(!) economies of制 leat the level of the firm, (2) external economies, 
(3）‘contestable markets' (Baumol, et al., 1982), (4) Cournot oligopoly, 
and (5) monopoli剖tccompetition. The first由r開 areof inter田t担this
paper. 
m. Economi問。fScale 
The easiest form of scale economies is increasmg re加msat the firm 
level. The larger the firm, other things being equal, the better it can over-
come indivisibilities. Certain overhead costs, which are independent of 
scale, wtll declme as production expands 
How加1portantare these type of economies of scale in actual 
economies? In the US, evidence indicates they were exhausted in the 
1950s and 1960s. However, recent studies by Scherer (1980) shows 
the upris卸Eevaluations, due to factors such as; (1）“industries”often 
produce many products, so that many products may be produced at les 
than opt加alscale, (2) economies of multiplant operation not captured 
by plant-based estimates of民ale・economies, and (3) dynamic scale 
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economies internal to f祉ms.Of cour田， wehave to pay attention to the 
“very recent managerial hterature that stre回目theproblems of incentive, 
control, and morale which ari田 asorga叫zationsgrow large and which 
can outweigh purely technical factors" {p. 33). 
Economies of scale at the firm level泊1pliesthai price・ taking behavior 
of the firm is inconsistent Wlth non-negative profits, and markets tend to 
be卸1perfectlycompetitive. Here one should be specific about how 
price－田t担Ef町田behave In particular: 
{!) Whether firms with market power act卸 acooperative or non-
cooperative加：hion? Leaving aside也esituation where firms seem to 
work in somewhat cooperative way, we confme the model to the ca田S
of noncoopera!Jon 
(2）百四国eof stra担gicfactors or variables in terms of which由e
noncooperat1ve game is played and conditions of entry皿deXJt from吐10
industry. Strategic variables used in也eCoumot model are the outputs, 
四dh血eBertrand model, the vanables町e世田prices.h1也efirst model, 
firms choose世田profit-maximizingoutput taking other firms’outputs as 
E員ven.h1也esecond, forms choose the profit-maximizing pri民 taking
other firms' pri田sas given. And “there has always been a tension bet-
ween these two approach白”（p.35). 
h 世田 discuss10nsabout entry四 de皿t,two important questions 
asked are: (a) Whether entry w温 eliminateeconomic profits, and 
{b) What are由eme拙ures血at釦msin阻 industrytake to discourage 
poten!Jal competitors. Helpman and Krugman concentrate on the first 
question. 
IV. External E回nomies 
One ca田 wheremcreasmg re加rnsare consistent Wlth perfect competi-
tion is when returns to scale are constant at the level of the f"rm and the 
social increasing 出血rnstake the form of external economies 
External effects can ari田 fromany economic activity. Let us show 
this by the generalized production function x = F {v, e), where x isthe 
output under conside阻.!Jon,v isthe泊putvector，阻de is血evector of 
al ‘external’mfiuences. 
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Traditional treatment of 'e' regards註asthe output of the domestic 
industry. However, a more general arrangement can be found by the 
introduct10n of not only industry-specific or country”spec百icvariables 
but also international and interindustry effects. 
Now, consider a production function which 1s homogeneous of degree 
one in v, i.e., x = f(av, X) = af(v,X), where a IS a posit卸econstant and 
X 1s the mdustry’s output, and having increasing re加rnsfrom the point 
of view of the industry as a whole. Then, we can、;vriteX = g (X) f (v), 
a則 mingthat此aleeffects enter multiplicatively, where f （・） e出 bits
constant re加rns More generally, we can have an industry production 
function in the form X = F (v) which exhibits increasing returns. 
But how can we explain the way industry output enters into也e
firm's production function？百iefollowing arguments are made: 
(!)Beginning with Marshall (1920) and continuing to Ethier (1979), 
economists have argued that a larger industry is able to田pportproduc-
hon of a wider variety of intermediate inputs at lower cost.“If this is 
the reason for industy economies of scale, however, the problem of 
handling the effects of scale economies on market structure has not 
really been solved Rather, it has been concealed血r。ughan incomplete 
specification of the model .. , certain spec泊las四mptionsabout the 
market structure of the intermediate goods industry can cau田 the
economy to behave ‘as正’ thereare true technological external eco-
nom1es, but this 1s by no means a general r田ult”（p.3ηー
(2) The second ar伊mentinsists that“it is really an mternal economy 
story in which something is const四国ingfirms to price at average cost” 
(p. 37). Threat of entry by the potent阻lcompetitors can田rvetoward 
this objective, as Baumol and others組曲tin their ar串imentsfor the 
“contestable market". But as they say，“average cost pric泊Eimposed by 
the threat of entry is not always the回me担 itsnnplications for inter-
national trade as average cost pricmg resulting from perfect competition 
and constant pnvate returns to scale" (p 3η． 
(3) F泊aly,one can argue that the external effects are the results of 
the inab出tyof firms to appropriate knowledge complete勿.Information 
can be gained by the finn from either research and development (R&D) 
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or through experience, which 1s often given by word of mouth or de-
liberate “rev er田 engineering”.Therefore, it is unbkely that the first 
mnovative industries wil ordinarily be perfectly competitive. Further, 
the “generation of knowledge pomts one in the direction of a dyn町nic
rather than a purely static model" (p. 37). 
The conclusion of Helpman and Krugman is that the static external 
economies models are at best a rough proxy for more complex models. 
But the question they raise about the unit to which external economies 
apply is worth examining. Traditionally, the nat10n-state has been 
町四medto be the object of externalities, but as Ethier (1979) points 
out，正externaleconomies arise from economies of scale m the produc-
tion of intermediate goods, and if these goods are tradable, then it is 
natural to consider the mternational rather than national externahties. 
Ano吐1erpomt we have to pay. attention to is the case of externalities 
resulting from incomplete appropriability of knowledge. In this ca揖
which unit is relevant for externalities depends on the details of how 
innovations diffuse. Here agam if the fmns gain from the international 
channels, their external benefits are mterna!lonal rather than泊tra-
national. 
V. Contestable Markets 
The idea of the‘conte洛tablemarket', first discussed by Baumol, et al , 
in the outstanding book Contestable Marke白 andThe Theory of In-
dustηS的1cture,is a syn血e垣sof the contributions泊valuetheory and 
the theory of industrial organ包ation.
Wi血 regardto value theory，世ieyattempt to explain由efollowing: 
(!) Standard analysis of output and pnces 回目mesthat the structure 
of particular mdustries is determmed outside the domam. However, the 
struc加reof担dustryin the real economy is primarily determined by 
economic forces.“Thus a central task of our work is the恒tegration
of the process of structure determmation泊toour model and the extrac-
!lon of theoretical and policy町1plicationsfrom the re田ltingexpanded 
construct”(p. 2) 
(2) JS. Ba加’spotential compe!ltion, that is the mere threat of entry, 
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can have enormous consequences for the general welfare and can affect 
the behavior of firms. Freedom of entry and exit is a matter of com-
parable importance. 
(3) Identiちringa田伊entof oligopoly analysis in which one is not 
troubled by the usual problems of indeterminancy and co市山ral
variations. The behavior of potential entrants provides this determinancy. 
For the theory of mdustnal organization, they introduce analysis of 
industries compri田dof multiproduct firms For al of these ca田Sthe 
receJVed theory of demand is well developed, but吐1etheory of produc-
tion, as it relates to industry structure, 1s not. They develop and analyse 
several characteristics of multiproduct cost functions, underlying features 
of productJVe techniques, and dependence on relative factor prices. 
Connections between the na旬開 ofthe田tof available produclive 
techruques and the character of the industry struc加rethat 1s efficient 
for the produclion of the output vectors consistent with market demands 
are the beginnings of a theory of the determinat10n of mdustry structure. 
The special form of behavior by potential entrants may be a rat10nal 
respon担 toidealized, reversible, and frictionless entry and exit.‘'This 
degree of freedom of entry forces industry担 equilibriumto adopt the 
structure that is efficient, and卸1po田sa number of other四rprisingand 
desirable properties on any泊dustryequ出brium”(p.3). 
With these m mind, Baumol and o血ersdefined the “perfectly con-
testable" markets under which free entry involving the absence of 
barriers forces socially optimal behavior upon the mcumbent firms m 
an industry (p. 5). 
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国際貿易と競争市場
〈要約〉
木村憲二
規模にかんする収穫逓増(IRS）と不完全競争を分析できる国際貿易の
模型にたいする接近は，ヘルプ7 ンとタルグ7ンの近著『市場構造と外
国貿易』（1985）の登場によって大きく前進した。
伝統的な一般均衡（GE）分析は，（1）貿易量，（2）貿易の構成，（3）企業内
交易の大きさと呆すべき役割，対外直接投資，および（4）貿易自由化の厚
生上の効果，の分析を可能とするように拡充される必要があったのであ
るが，規模にかんする収穫逓増の導入によって容易に理解されるものと
なった。貿易量の大きさにかんする在来型の説明は，要素賦存量のちが
いによるヘクシャー ウリー ン（Hー 0）型のものが主流であるが，世界
貿易の半分近くが要素賦存量の類似した構成をもっ国々のあいだの貿易
で占められているという事実を考えるとき，著しく不充分であるといわ
なければならない。貿易の構成についても，往復貿易の存在を考えれば，
純輸出のタームて’の分析を必要としている。
企業内交易と対外直接投資の分析も，完全競争と規模にかんして収穫
不変の前提にもとづく在来型的分析では解明できないものであった。貿
易自由化のもつ厚生効果の分析は，在来型では資源の配分の編成がえを
考えてなされているのであるが，今日のECやUSー カナダ自動車協定
のように，資源の再配分を行わない仕方での厚生増大策がみられている
時代にはそぐわないものとなっている。
国際貿易理論へのニュー・アプロ一千は，このような野心的な試みで
あるだけに，多くの示唆と共に不充分な点をのこしている。小論はこの
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点についてのサーヴェイをあたえることを目標としたものであり，構成
としては， I 序論， I.要素比率理論と市場構造，匝規模の経済， N
外部経済，コンテスタブノレ・ 7ーケット，参考文献となっている。英文
の原題は「国際貿易におけるコンテスタブノレ・ 7ーケy ト」であるが，
すこし長いので日本語の題は「国際貿易と競争市場J とした。
